MATH 344 - Game Theory
Lecture topics
Topics covered in each lecture will be listed below, with relevant chapter in the book. Many other books and lecture notes on game theory have been written, and may be helpful. These can be found in the library or online.
| Date | Chapter | Notes | Topics |
|---|---|---|---|
| 09-04 | Ch. 1 | overview, types of games, combinatorial games, subtraction, CHOMP | |
| 09-06 | Ch. 1 | An allocation game and utility, formal definitions, progressively bounded games | |
| 09-16 | Ch. 1 | Strategy stealing, NIM | |
| 09-18 | Ch. 1 | NIM solution, sums of games | |
| 09-20 | Ch. 1 | sum of games and NIM-sums | |
| 09-23 | Ch. 1 | double counting, computing Grundy values | |
| 09-25 | Ch. 1 | Grundy values for sums of games | |
| 09-27 | Ch. 1 | 0 sum games, saddle points, optimal replies | |
| 10-04 | Ch. 2 | Safety strategies in small games | |
| 10-07 | Ch. 2 | Safety strategies are optimal; domination, solving larger games | |
| 10-09 | Ch. 2 | Strategies for solving games | |
| 10-11 | Ch. 2 | More strategies for solving games | |
| 10-16 | Ch. 2 | Convex sets, Hyperplane separation lemma | |
| 10-21 | Ch. 2 | Proof of the hyperplane separation lemma | |
| 10-23 | Ch. 2 | Proof of von Neumann`s minimax theorem | |
| 10-25 | Ch. 3 | General sum games: safety strategies | |
| 10-28 | Ch. 3 | Nash equilibria | |
| 10-30 | Ch. 3 | More on Nash equilibria | |
| 11-01 | Ch. 3 | Tragedy of the commons, more Nash equilibria | |
| 11-04 | Ch. 4 | Brouwers fixed point and Existence of Nash Equilibrium | |
| 11-06 | Ch. 5 | Sperners Lemma | |
| 11-08 | Ch. 5 | End of the proofs, repeated games | |
| 11-15 | Ch. 6 | Repeated games | |
| 11-18 | Ch. 6 | Partial information, poker | |
| 11-20 | Ch. 10 | Stable matchings | |
| 11-22 | Ch. 10 | Stable matchings | |
| 11-25 | Ch. 11 | Fair allocations | |
| 11-27 | Ch. 12 | Cooperative games | |
| 11-29 | Ch. 12 | Cooperative games; Nash Bargaining | |
| 12-02 | Ch. 12 | Nash Bargaining | |
| 12-04 | Ch. 13 | Social choice and ranking | |
| 12-06 | Ch. 13 | Social choice and ranking |